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WHICH: IMPRO'VES WELFARE MORE: 
NOMINAL OR  INDEXED BOND  ? 
1. Introduction 
Despite economists' long standing arguments in favor of systematic indexation of  loan con- 
tracts to remove the risks associated with fluctuations in the purchasing power of  money (Jevons 
(1875), Marshall (1887, 1923), F~lsher  (1922), Friedman (1991)), surprisingly few loan contracts 
are indexed in most Western Eclonomies.  fin the United States even thirty year corporate and 
government bonds are not indexed. The situation is  however different in many Latin A.merican 
countries where indexing is widely used  as a way  of  coping with high and variable inflation 
rates.  What seems difiicult to eicplain is  that it takes lvgh variability in inflation rates before 
private sector agents shift from lmindexed to indexed contracts. 
In practice, indexing a loan contract m.eans linking its payoff  to the value of  an officially 
computed  price index such as  the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Such an index is  always an 
imperfect measure of  the purchasing power of  money: in particular, it fluctuates not only mth 
variations in the general level of  prices but also varies with changes in the relative prices of 
goods.  This paper formalizes the idea that the imperfections of  indexing may serve tal explain 
why agents prefer nominal bonds in economies with a low  variability in  purchasing power of 
money and only resort to indexing when the variability becomes sufficiently high. 
The model is a variant of  the two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete markets 
(GEI)  in which the purchasing power of  money depends on a (broadly defined) measure of  the 
amount of  money available in the economy and on an index of  real output.  The objective of 
the analysis is to compare two second-best situations, in which in addition to a given security 
structure, there is  either a  nominal bond which has the risks induced by  fluctuations in the 
purchasing power of  money or an indexed bond which  has the risks induced by relative price 
fluctuations. 
Adding a bond to an existing market structure has two effects:  the first is the direct effect 
of  increasing the span of  the fmancial markets i.e.  increasing the opportunity sets of  agents 
for transferring income; the second is the indirect effect of  changing spot and security prices, 
which can either increase or decrease agents' welfare. This paper only compares direct effects, 
all indirect effects being absent by  virtue of  the specification of  agents' preferences. The direct 
effects are always present, even with more general preferences, but some of  the results that we $1. Introduction 
obtain mav no longer apply if  the indirect effects are sufficiently strong (see Cass-Citanna (1994) 
and Ellul (1995) for a complete 1.ocal analysis of  the combined effects). The characteristics of 
the economy (described in section 2) are such that: 
(i) the multigood model can be mapped into a purchasing power economy in which there 
are well-defined (utility-based) in.dices  of the purchasing power of  money and aggregate output; 
(ii) an efficient equilibrium is  obtained if agents can trade a bond whose purchashg power 
payoff is  constant; 
(iii) if there is  no such (real) riskless bond, but only a risky bond, then the loss in welfare 
depends on the distance (in the appropriate probability metric) of  the market subspace from 
the riskless income stream. 
Thus the welfare gain from  adding a  bond to a given security structure is  measured by  how 
much closer the market subspace is  moved to the riskless income stream. The welfare gain is 
summarized  by a function which  we  call the statistical gains  function, since it depends on the 
vector  statistical propertie2 of  the bond, its standard deviation per unit of  expectation and it.; 
of  correlation coefficients with the existing securities. 
A complete analysis of  the prloperties of this gains function (Propositions 3 and 4) is  the 
main mathematical contribution of  the paper:  this is a necessary preliminary for determining 
which type of bond (nominal or indexed) leads to higher welfare. It follows from the properties 
of  the gains function that either  a  low  variability of  the  bond's  (real) income  stream or a 
strong (positive or negative) corrlelation of  its payoff  with the payoffs  of  the other securities 
(or a combination of  the two) pe-mits a high proportion of  the potential welfare gains to be 
captured: a low variability directly creates a security without much risk, while a high correlation 
permits a hedge portfolio of  the bond and the underlying securities to reduce risk. 
Ln the reduced form purchasing power economy, three groups of  factors iduence the real 
payoffs of  the indexed and nominal1 bonds. The first are sectoral shocks which affect the relative 
output of  the different sectors (goods) and hence the relative prices of  the goods: these shocks 
determine  the variability of  the payoff  of  the indexed  bond.  The second  are econornywide 
shocks which affect aggregate output and the third are monetary shocks which influence the 
"amount" of  purchasing power:  the ratio of these two magnitudes determines the purchasing 
power of  money, which is  the payoff of  the nominal bond.  In Proposition 5 it is shown that 
in an economy in which idation rmd  output are positively correlated and sectoral shocks lead 
to relative price fluctuations, there is a critical level of  fluctuations in the purchasing power of 
money below (above) which the nominal (indexed) bond is preferred. Thus in the framework of 5 1. Introduction 
this model, it is the existence of  sectoral shocks, in con,junction  with a relativelv strong positive 
correlation between inflation anti output wlhich serve to explain the lack of  indexation. 
The benefits and costs of  indexation have been extensively discussed in the macroeconomic 
literature (see for example Dornbusch and  Simonsen  (1983)).  While  the potential costs of 
indexation have been stressed in. the analysis of  wage contracts (indexation of wages can lead 
to built-in inflation and  to misaillocations arising from  inflexible real wages), in the analysis 
of  indexed  bonds no such costs lave been identified and most of  the attention has focused on 
the benefits of  isolating agents in the private sector from  price level fluctuations.  It lhas thus 
appeared as something of  a mystery that so few indexed contracts are used in most Western 
economies. 
In a series of  papers,1 Fischeir systematically examined possible explanations for this stub- 
born fact.  Fischer  (1975)  provided the first  formal analysis of  the impact  of  indexation of 
bonds in an equilibrium framework, using the continuous-time, Brownian motion  version of 
the one-good CAPM model in w:hich there are price level fluctuations and in which agents can 
trade a nominal bond, a perfectly indexed bond and an equity contract.  As Modigliani (1976) 
pointed out, since the perfectly indexed bond permits the riskless transfer of  income a:nd since 
the two-fund separation theorem holds, there is no trade in the nominal bond in equilibrium: 
with perfect indexation and a variable pric'e level, an indexed bond will always drive out the 
nominal bond.  This result, while providing a formalization of  the classical argument in favor 
of  indexation does not provide a model that explains why in practice so few indexed loans are 
traded.  A step in this direction was made by Viard (1993), using Fischer's model with constant 
relative risk aversion preferences: he argued that for some values of  the parameters the welfare 
gains of  introducing an indexed bond are small, once the nominal bond is  traded. 
Finally the idea that a multigood GEI model can be reduced to a finance model by using 
homothetic  preferences within slcates, was  studied by  Geanakoplos-Shubik (1990), who were 
interested in the appropriate definition of  a riskfree asset in the context of  a multigoodl CAPM 
model. 
'Collected  in Fischer (1986) $2.  The Economy 
2. The Economy 
In this section we present a variant of  the general equilibrium model with incomplete markets 
(GEI)  which leads to a tractablle study of  the issue of  indexation of nominal bonds.  Consider 
a  two-period (t = 0,l) economy with S 2  2 states of  natures  (s = 1, .  .  .  ,  S) at dake 1;  for 
convenience we  include date 0 as  state 0 and write s  = O,l,.  .  . ,  S.  There are I agents; each 
agent  i is characterized by an initial endowment consisting of  a vector w'  = (w& wi, . .  .  , ui)  of 
L goods  in each state and a utility function LP : R;('+')  -  R reflecting his preferences for the 
goods across the states.  Agents can trade on two types of  markets. Goods can be bought and 
sold on spot markets, the vector of  spot prices ps = (psi, .  .  .  ,  psL) in state s being expressed 
in units of  money.  Let p = (pol  pl,  . .  . ,  ps)  denote the vector of  spot prices.  In addition agents 
can trade (at date 0) on a system of  financial markets. To provide a convenient framework for 
analyzing the potential benefits of  indexing a bond, we consider a family of  J + 1 securities. 
Security zero, which is  the bond that may or may not be indexed, has a date 0 price (70 and a 
date 1 payoff stream 
A = (Al,.  . . ,As) 
The remaining J securities have prices (ql,  . . . ,  qJ) at date 0 and date 1 payoffs summarized by 
an S x J matrix 
Y = 
r,l  . .  .  Y,J 
the payoff of  security  j in  state s being Y?. Let 
denote the vector of  prices of  the J +  1 securities and their combined date 1 payoff mat~ix.  The 
payoffs of  the securities can be either real (dependent on the spot prices) or nominal (indepen- 
dent of  the spot prices) and in both cases are denominated in units of  money.  When security 
zero is  indexed (unindexed) its payoff is real (nominal). The payoffs on the remaining securities 
can be either real or nominal, but will be required to satisfy certain spanning conditions (As- 
sumption S) which imply that sane of  these securities are real (in essence, that they be equity 
contracts). To simplify notation, we  omit the explicit dependence of  the securities'  pabyof&  on 
the spot prices. 
If  zi  = (z;, zf,  . . .  ,  2;)  E  denotes the portfolio of  the J + 1 securities purch.ased by 
agent i and if  zi = (rb,  ri,  . . . , ri)  E R:'~'')  denotes his consumption stream of  the L goods, $2. The Economy 
then the agent's budget set is given by 
where [A, Y,]  denotes row s of  the matrix [A Y]. 
One of  the interesting properties of  the GEI model with nominal securities is  that price 
levels affect the real equilibrium allocation. This result can either be interpreted as exhibiting 
the indeterminacy of  equilibrium allocations when there are no forces determining prilce levels 
(Balask*Cass  (l989), Geanakoplos-Mas-ColeU (1989)) or as exhibiting the fact that fluc:tuations 
in the purchasing power of  money (ppm)  induced by monetary policy have real effects (Magill- 
Quinzii (1992)). In this paper w.e adopt the latter interpretation.  The general idea is to draw 
on the logic of  the quantity theory:  agents use money for transactions and a combination of 
a private sector banking system and a monetary authority determines the quantity of  money 
that is available for making transactions.  If'p, ~f=~  xt is the demand for money in stake s and 
Ms is the quantity of  money made available, then the price level in state s is determined by 
the monetary equation 
I 
For the sake of  interpretation we suppose there is a monetary authority with some (in certain 
cases very little) control over  M' = (Mo,  M
r
l, .  . .  ,  Ms) and we call M the monetary policy. If 
U = (U1,.  .  . ,  u')  and w = (wl,. . ,  wr), then &(U,  w,  A, Y, M) denotes the economy with agents' 
characteristics (U,  w), financial structure (A,,  Y) and monetary policy M. The exogenously given 
random variables (w, M)  which describe the underlying real and monetary sides of  the economy, 
can have a very general stochastic dependence. This permits a wide class of  econormes to be 
considered which can differ not only in the way in which monetary policy or shocks intervene, 
but also in the way money and output are correlated. 
2.1 Deftnit ion:  An equilibrium of  the economy & (U,  w, A, Y, M)  is a pair of  actions and prices 
((Z, Z),  (p,  ij)) = ((Z1,  . .  .  ,  Zr, El,.  . .  ,  E'),  @, ij)) such that 
(i) 5'  E arg max  {U'(xi)  1 3:'  E  B(p, ij, w'))  and 2 finances Zi,  i = 1,.  .  . ,1 
I  I 
(ii)  C  (5' -  wi) = 0  (iii) C 2 = 0 
i=l  i=:L 
I 
(iv) p,  C 25  = Ms,  s  = 0,1,. .  .  ,  S. 
i= 1 
The abstract model presented above is (capable  of  covering many different types of  financial $2. The Economy 
securities,  in particular, two important  classes of  securities whch are used  to finance many 
activities in an economy -  bonds and equitiy contracts.  Equity contracts are readily included 
by adapting the abstract exchang;e  economy to represent a production economy in which firms 
have fixed production plans. The initial ownership of the K firms in the economy is distributed 
among the I agents, 6;  of firm  k  being owned  by agent  i.  Agent i then has initial resources in 
the abstract economy consisting cd two components 
where wi E R$('"  is a pmxy for the agent's labor income and $  is the production plan of firm 
k.  If  the financial markets include a stock market on which the equity contract of each firm is 
traded, then there is  a security with payoff in state s (s = 1,.  .  .  ,  S) given by 
If  8;  is  the amount of equity k purchased by agent i (at date 0), then zi = 8i  -  6:  is the agent's 
net trade in  the kth  equity contract.  As a class of  contracts, bonds are typically designed to 
be less risky than equity contracts:  modulo tihe problem of  default, a bond promises a stable 
nominal payoff across the states of  nature, while equity contracts have payoffi which fluctuate 
directly with the contingencies that affect  the performance of individual firms.  However, the 
stable nominal payoff of a bond only translates into a stable real payoff  if  there are no 13uctu- 
ations in the purchasing power of  money.  The fact that variations in pprn introduce risks into 
securities designed to be essentially riskfree has long been viewed by economists as introduc- 
ing an inefficiency that should be iivoided.  Hence the idea that monetary policy should. seek, 
as far as possible, to achieve a stable ppm or,, if  imperfections in the control of  the monetary 
transmission mechanism or political. factors make this unfeasible, that bonds should be indexed. 
Our objective is  to find a  way of  formalizing these ideas.  We  will  not try to address the 
general  problem  of  indexing a family of  nominal securities.  Rather, we  shall focus on  the 
benefits and costs of  indexing the least risky nominal bond -  namely the default-free bond. To 
do this, we need to give more specifi'c structure to the characteristics of  the economy -  basically 
assumptions on agents' endowments and preferences and on the security structure which ensure 
that agents would  really benefit from the presence of  a bond with a riskless real purchasing 
power.  We  want to show that, in a multigood setting, indexing is  not the universal panacea 
:for neutralizing fluctuations in ppm that is often suggested: indexing inevitably intr~duc~es  the 
~Sisks  of  relative price fluctuations and in some cases these risks may exceed the risks arising 52. The Economy 
from fluctuations in ppm. The first assumpt~ion  places a restriction on agents' preferences which 
implies that spot prices are independent of  the income distribution and are thus independent of 
agents' choices on the financial markets. This eliminates a feedback between the spot markets 
and the financial markets, and greatly simplifies the analysis of  the model. 
Assumption H:  Agents have s'eparable-homothetic utility functions of  the form 
where 71,. .  . ,rs  are strictly positive probabilities of  the states,  A& > 0, h : R$ -  R,  f' : 
R -  R, both h and fi are increasing, concave and differentiable and h is  homoge~neous  of 
degree 1. 
Let w,  = ~f,~  w:  denote the aggregate output in state s (s = 0,1,.  . . ,  S). Assumption H 
implies that the equilibrium  vector of  spot prices p,  in state s is  proportional to the ,gradient 
of  h at the aggregate endowment.  Using the Euler identity Vh(ws)ws = h(ws) and writing the 
monetary equations as p3ws = hrs,  s =  O,l,. . . ,  S leads to the equilibrium spot prices 
In an equilibrium the maximum problem of  each agent can be decomposed into two steps: 
the first is a choice of  a  portfolio  (z')  on  t.he financial markets, the second is the choice of  a 
vector of consumption (xi)  on th'e spot markets. The choice of  a portfolio by agent i generates 
an income stream across the states 
The agent then selects a vector of  consumption which is affordable given this income stream 
In view of  Assumption H, the vector of consumption chosen by agent i can be deduced once 
.  . 
his expenditure stream m' = (mb,  mi,  . .  .  ,  mfs) is known $2. The Economy 
Substituting (7) into the utilitv function  Ui(z') in  Assumption H and exploiting  the homo- 
geneity of  degree 1 of  h,, gives the utilitv of  agent i as a function of  his expenditun, stream 
mi 
where 
is a  utility index of  the purchasin:g power of  money. The numerator in  (9) is an ideal (utility 
based) index of  aggmgate output in state s. The aggregate output wsr  of  good e in state s is 
weighted by its social (representative agent) marginal utility in state s, e,  and the index 
measures the representative agent's utility h(w,) at the total output w,'. 
Purchasing Power  Economy.  Since agents'  preferences over expenditure streams are ex- 
pressed by (8),  the analysis of  the equilibrium problem for the economy E(U,  w,  A, Y,  M) can be 
reduced to the analysis of  the equilibrium of  a finance economy in which all quantities (income 
and expenditure streams, security payoffs) are converted to real (i.e. purchasing power) values. 
To this end, define each agent's  red income and expenditure stream  (i = 1,. .  .  ,  I) 
and let 
S 
s=  1 
denote the utility to agent i of the real expenditure stream $ E R:".  If we  define the real 
prices and payoff streams of  the se~curities  (j  = 0,1,.  .  .  ,  J) 
then the financial problem of agent i reduces to choosing a portfolio zi E RJ+'  which maximizes 
u'  in the budget set 
t  A L;) eeo  -  q'zi,  E  RJ+' 
I.L5=ef+[asVs]  z',  s=1,  ...,  S 
'Lf  h is  the CobbDouglas utility function then the index of output in state s is the geometric mean of the L 
components of  aggregate output (wSl,.  .  . ,  w,~),  the weight assigned to good e being its coefficient in the Cobb 
Douglas function. The purchasing power 43f  money vs  is  then obtained by dividing the index of  aggregate. output 
by the money supply M,. 52.  The Economy 
where V = iv'  . . .  vJ]  is  the mat,rix of  real pavoffs of  securities j  = 1,.  . . ,  J and  V,  is. the row 
corresponding to state s.  Let e'  = (ek, ef.,  . .  . ,  ek), e = (el,.  .  . ,el) denote the real  values of 
agents' endowments, v = (ul,.  .  .  ,  ul) their utility functions for real income and a = (al,.  .  . ,  as) 
the real pavoff stream on the default-free bond, then we  call E(u,  e,  a,  V)  the purchasing  power 
economy induced by the monetary economy &(U,  w,  A, Y,  M). 
The next assumption permits explicit calculations to be made of  the welfare consequences 
of  alternative real payoff  streams a for  the bond, depending on whether the nomind payoff 
A is  indexed or unindexed furthermore the welfare comparisons have a natural econc~mic  and 
geometric interpretation. The assumption requires that agents have mean-variance preferences 
-  a convenient (if crude) first approximation for describing the wav agents evaluate risks. 
Assumption Q:  For each agent the function  :  R -  R in Assumption H is  quadratic 
Finally we  include a spannin,g assumption on the security structure Y which ensures that 
in the purchasing power (pp)  economy the riskless real income stream 1  = (1,.  .  .  ,1) becomes a 
reference income stream for measuring the llosses due to fluctuations in  ppm and the potential 
gains from indexation.  For when the security structure Y is  well-adapted to the agents'' endow- 
ment risks @sw5):=i,l,  then in the pp economy the most important missing security is the riskless 
real bond P  and welfare losses or gains can be expressed in terms of  the distance of  the market 
subspace ([a V]) from 1.  We  use the following notation:  for any vector x = (xo,  xi,  .  . . , x,  ) , 
XI = (xl,  .  .  .  ,  xs) denotes the vector of  date! 1 components. 
Assumption S:  For each agent i = 1,.  .  .  ,  .1 
@wl, .  .  .  , ~sw;)  E  (Y)  eh  (V) 
If  the agents endowments have the form given in  (2), then the spanning assumption  ;mounts 
to requiring that Y contains the equity contracts of the corporate 6rms and enough additional 
securities to permit agents to share their personal income risks @,rtli):='=l  -  or equivalently, 
that their  private sources of  income  (for example  their  wage  income or their  inco~me  from 
individually owned firms) are subject to the same shocks as the corporate sector.  However we 
assume that the security structure is incomplete in that the subspace (V) of  the pp (economy 
does not contain  IL  and has dimension less than S -  1 (there are no securities which, provide 53.  Welfare and the Statistical Characteristics of the Bond 
direct insurance against monetary shocks and it would take more than one additional bond to 
complete the markets).  For  convenience we  add  two  purely technical conditions:  real pavoff 
streams are non-redundant and have positive expected values. 
Assumption I:  (i) 1  4 (V) (ii) rank V = J  (iii) J I  S -  2 (iv) E(d)  > 0,  j = 1,.  .  .  , J 
Assumption H reduces the analysis of  the multigood economy &(U,  w,  A, Y,  Ad)  to the anal- 
ysis of  the purchasing power economy &(u,  e, a,  V).  Under Assumptions Q, S and I, this pp 
economy satisfies the assumptions of  the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),  in  which how- 
ever, if a is  risky (or more precisely if l  @ (a,  V)  ), the riskless transfer of  income is  not p~ossible. 
Jl  a  = 1  or  P E  (a,  V)  then by a standard result the equdibria of  &(u,  e, a, V) are Pareto op 
timal:  thus when a is  risky there: is  a loss  :relative to the ideal situation a = B.  If  A is  the 
default-free nominal bond  then  its nominal payoff  is  An  = 1 and its real payoff  is  just  the 
purchasing power of  money aN =:  v = (vl  ,  .. .  . , us):  the greater the fluctuations in ppm,  the 
greater the risks of aN. On the other hand if A is indexed on the value of  a reference bundle of 
goods b = (bl,  .  .  . ,  bL) f  R~ then its nominal, payoff stream is  AR = (Plb,.  .  . ,  Ssb) and in view 
of  (4) and  (9), its real payoff  stream is aR = (Vh(wl)b,.  . . ,  Vh(ws)b).  While aR is isolated 
from fluctuations in ppm, it does :however vary with fluctuations in  Vh(ws) i.e.  those induced 
by  underlying real shocks which atfect the relative aggregate supplies of  the goods. In order to 
explain the conditions under which the agents are better off  using the nominal or the indexed 
bond, we  need to understand how  the welfare of the agents in an equilibrium depends on the 
characteristics of the income stream a -  its variability and the way it covaries with th~e  other 
securities in the economy summarimed by  V. 
3. Welfare and the Statistical Characteristics of the Bond 
A geometric approach to the welfare analysis of  equilibria of  an economy in  which agents 
have mean-variance preferences can be obtainled using projections under the probability i:nduced 
and its associated  norm $3.  Welfare and the Statistical Chara~teristics  of  the Bond 
Two vectors x,  y E  are said t:o be y-orthogonal if  [[.c?  y]] = 0.  For a subspace W c  FtS,  let 
wV denote the 7-orthogonal complement, namely the subspace of  vectors y-orthogo:onal to all 
vectors in W. Since itS can be dsecomposed as a direct sum R'  = W @ wV,  any vector x E  R' 
can be written uniquely 
x==x*+x
f, xlEW,  x
f
  E wJ- 
x* (resp.  .I!)  is called the 7-orthlogonal  projection of  x onto W (resp. onto w~)  and we write 
x* = projwx, d = proj  x.  The ?-projection  x* onto W is  the vector in the sub:jpace W 
wU. 
which lies closest to x in the 7-norm i.e. it solves the problem 
If  W is  the subspace of  R'  spanned by  the k linearly independent columns of  an S x I- matrix 
W (i.e.  W = (W) and rank W = k) then the matrix which represents the 7-projection (in the 
standard basis) is 
1  T  B, = W[W~[YIWI-  W  171  (4) 
where 
is the diagonal matrix of  probabilities. The matrix B,  in (4) can be readily derived by solving 
the problem (3) and showing that x* = Bw  z. Note that if  x E W then B, x = x. 
If  W is  the payoff  matrix of  k securities; in a one-good two-period economy E(v,  e, W) in 
which agents' utility functions are linear-quadratic 
then the welfare of  the agents at an  equdibrium can be expressed as a function of  the subspace 
W = (W). The expression is simplified when the date 1 initial endowments of  the agents lie in 
the market subspace i.e.  when ei E W,i =  1,.  .  . ,I. 
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Welfare of Agents): Let I(u,  e, W) be a one-good, twtrperiod 
economy in  which agents have hear  quadratic utility functions (5) and in which ei E W, i = 
1,.  .  . , I. Then the welfare of the agents at t.he equilibrium is given by 
2 
pro  k  i=1,  ...,  I $3. Welfare and the Statistical Characteristics of  the Bond 
I  where a  =  a',. Xo = ~f=~  A;  and (ki),!=l are constants depending on the characteristics 
(Ah, a', ei)Ll  of the economy. 
Proof: Let  (f  l,  . . . , zi,  zl,. . .  ,  fr,  q) denote the equilibrium and let el = zhl  ei denote the 
date 1 aggregate endowment of  the economy.  A straightforward calculation (see Mad.-Quinzii 
(1994, Exercise 5, Chapter 3) shows that thee  equilibrium security prices are given by 
the agents'  portfolio vectors are 
and their equrlibrium consumption streams are 
where we  have used the equality 13,e';  = e';  implied by  e';  E  W.  Inserting the expression for 
fa  into the utility functions (5) leads to (6).  0 
Since there is  a sufficiently rich structure of  financial securities for  agents to share their 
endowment risks, the maximum welfare is  obtained when, in addition, the riskless transfer of 
income is possible (1  E W); in this case, 11 proj,l  Ilr=ll  1  /Ir=  1 and the equilibrium allocation 
is  Pareto optimal, since the allocation is  the same as if  the markets were complete (W :=  R~). 
When the riskless transfer of  inco:me is  not  ]possible (P $ W), then  (1  projwl (I,<  1 and if 
agents do not have identical preferences (%  #  for some i  , there is a loss of  welfare  The  ) 
smaller the ?-distance of the market subspace W from 1, the greater the norm  I( proj  :l  (I-,  of 
the y-projection of  1  onto W, and the greater the welfare of  the agents. 
Since the vector projwl plays ern  important role in the analysis that follows, it is useful to 
introduce the shorthand notation 
77,  = projw1 
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Proposition 2 (Properties of Least  Risky Security): The y-projection qw of 11  onto W 
has the following properties: 
(i) Under the ?-inner  product on R~,~,  represents the expectation operator on 'W 
(ii) 7,  is  the least risky income stream in the market subspace W in the following two 
senses: 
(a) geometrically, it is the vector in W  which lies closest to B 
(b)  statistically, it is the vector in W which has the miniruum standard deviation  per 
unit of  expected return 
(iii:) the minima in (a) and (b)  lead to two measures of the riskiness of the market subspace: 
1 
(b)' -  -  1 =(,= -- 
E(qW)  (a)) 
Proof:  (i) Since I -qw  E w~,E(~)  = [[1,y]]  = [[q,,,,~]]  for all y E  W. 
(ii) (a) follows from (3). To prove (b),  consider the problem: min{ var y I y E  W, E(y) == 1) and 
suppose that qW/E(qW)  is not the solution. Then there exists y'  E W with E(y
l) = 1 and var 
y'  < ~arq,/E(~,)~.  Let y = E(qw)y' then y satisfies E(g) = E(qw)  and var  <  varqw * 
E(g2) < E(qw)2.  Then  11  I -  g ll:=  1 -  2E(g)  + E($)  < 1 -  2E(qw)  + E(q$) =]I 1  -  sw  11; 
contradicting the definition of  q,,. 
(iii) follows by noting that (i) implies E(&)  = E(q,).  0 
Welfare Gains Function.  We want to apply Proposition 1 to a purchasing power economy 
&(u,  el  a,  V), namely a one-good economy with payoff matrix 
When a changes, it alters the market subspace $3.  Welfare and the Statistical Characteristics of the Bond 
and our objective is  to understand how the welfare of  agents varies with the "characteristics" 
of  the bond a.  Since in  (8), V  is  taken as fixed, a convenient wav of  analyzing how  welfare 
depends on a is  to make the comparison with the case where a is redundant (a E V  == (V)). 
The utility of  agent i at the equilibrium with. market subspace Va can be written as 
where the first term G,  = G& -  fib can be interpreted as the utility gain to agent i of  having 
the bond with characteristics a. By Proposition 1, this gain can be written as 
where ci = 4x1,  (  % -  %)2  is a non-negative coeflicient which is positive for all "non-average" 
agents.  Since the subspace V,  contains V,  )I  qva 11;  2  1)  5  I]:,  SO  that the gain G, is  non- 
negative for all agents and is strictly positive if cz > 0 and a 4 V.  We are thus led to study the 
function G : FtS -  R defined by 
which we call the welfare gains function, since the utility gains to all agents are proportional to 
the function G. This property of tht: model, that the utility gains of all agents are proportional to 
the common function G -  in particular that all agents are made better off when a nonred~mdant 
bond a is  added to an existing security structure V -  requires some explanation. 
Ln general, introducing a new security has two effects:  the first -  which we  may call the 
direct effect -  is to increase the span of  the markets i.e.  the trading opportunities available in 
the economy, and this tends to increase the welfare of  the agents; the second -  which we may 
call the indirect effect -  is to change all prices, both spot and security prices, and this can 
either increase or decrease agents' utilities.  Combining the two effects can lead to  the apparently 
paradoxical result that introducing a new security decreases the welfare of  all agents, is  first 
shown in an example by Hart (19751).  More recently CassCitanna (1994) and Ellul(1995) have 
studied the case where all (and hence the indirect) effects are marginal and have shown that 
if  the markets are sufficiently incomplete then in a multigood economy the combination of  the 
two effects can lead to any possible local change in agents' utilities. Even in a one-good model, 
because the prices of  the existing securities normally change with the introduction of  a new 
security, typically some agents gain and some agents loose from the introduction of  a sxurity. 
In this paper the indirect price effects are canceled: there is no effect from spot prices because 53. Welfare and the Statistical Cl~ara~cteristics  of  the Bond 
of Assumption H, and no effect from security prices because of  the linear-quadratic form of the 
agents'  utility functions? as can be seen horn  formula (7) for the equilibrium security prices. 
Thus the analysis concentrates 011 the direct; effect of  changing the span of  the markets and this 
effect is  present in all economies. The analysis can thus be applied to an economy in which the 
price effects are sufficiently small., or it can be taken as the first half of a more complete study 
in which indirect effects are also explicitly taken into account. 
The next step is  to analyze  the properties of  the welfare gains  function G(a):  we  will 
show that the gain depends oniy on the statistical properties of  the income stream a E R~ 
summarized by its mean, standard deviation and its correlation coefficients with the securities 
vl, .  . . ,  vJ. Furthermore we  will show that the gain can be described in a very compllete way 
for any number of  securities J,  and any number of  states of  nature S.  The derivation of  the 
properties of  G as a function of  the statistical attributes of a requires some calculatiorts which 
are left  to section 5.  Here we  summarize  .these properties and for  the case (J = 1, S = 3) 
provide a simple geometric interpretation of' the results. 
Since G(a) is derived by  proj~ecting  11 onto Va  and V, it depends only on the directions of 
the vectors (a,  vl,  . .  . ,  v
J) and not on their lengths.  Thus all these vectors can be normalized 
and the most natural economic interpretatio:n is obtained by normalizing each vector so that its 
expected value is  one.  This requires that each of  these date 1 payoff streams have a non-zero 
expected value:  this is assured for vl,.  . . ,  vJ  by Assumption I (iv), and will be assured1 for the 
bond by restricting attention to bonds with positive expected values (a  E R'  with E(,a)  > 0). 
The following notation for normalized variables is convenient: for any random variable a: E 
with E(x) > 0, the normalized variable with expectation 1 is denoted by 
If  u(x) denotes the standard deviation of  x, then o(B)  = %i;f  measures the standard deviation 
of  the income stream x per unit of  expected value:  for  brevity we  write a? = ~(2).  Since the 
Z'JV  Z,Y  correlation coefficient p(z,  y) =  C&  between a pair of  vectors x, y E R'  does not depend 
on their lengths, p(2, ij) =  p(x, 3): for brevity we  write pq.  Let 
[pv;vl  -  pvq 
~a=(~avlr-..,Pav~)r  Pv = 
PVJVl .  . .  PvJvJ 
denote the vector of correlation coefficients between the bond a and the securities vL,.  . . ,  v
J 
and the matrix of  correlation coefficients between these securities, respectively. 53. Welfare and the Statistical Charircteristics of the Bond 
The next proposition asserts that the gain G(a) depends only on (a&,  pa) i.e. there exists a 
function g : R x  ElJ -  R  such that G(a) =  g(u&,  pa).  In  order to deduce the properties of  G 
from those of  g it is  necessary to determine the scbset (domain) of  R  x R~ on which g coincides 
with G i.e.  the values (a,  p) E  R, x R~ which correspond to the standard deviation and vector 
of correlation coefficients of  a normalized random variable S E ItS. 
Proposition 3 (Existence of Statistical Gains  Function): 
(i) Let (a,  p)  E R  x R~,  then the=  e,.s  a random miable a E R~  with E(a) :>  0 such 
that (aa,  pa) = (a,  p) if  and only if  either (a,  p) = (0,O) or a  > 0  and  p belongs to the convex 
domain 7Z defined by 
R  = {  p E R.'  I [p, -  ppT] is  positive semi-defmite)  (10) 
(ii)  The boundary of R  is  a7C  =  E  721  det  [p, -  pPT] = 0).  If a  is  a random  variable 
with pa  E  a72, then there exists y E V  such that 
p(a, y)  = fl  ^a -  P = X(y -  E(y)l)  for some X E R  (11) 
(iii) There e-vists a  function g  R x R.' -  R such that if (a,p) E  R++ x R  U {O,O)  then 
g(a,  p) = G(a) for d  a E R'  (with E(a)  > 0) such that (a&,  pa) = (a,  p). 
Proof:  (See section 5) 
The next proposition describes the properties of the function g,  which we  call the statistical 
gains function, since it expresses the gain fkom a bond a as a function of  its statistical properties 
(aal  pa). Since the securities (vl,  .  . .  ,  v
J) are taken as fixed, the projection qV of  11  onto 'V  forms 
part of  the data of  the problem:  tlo  reflect this we  let 
In Proposition 2 we  introduced the two measures, 1 -  E(q)  and a+,  of  the riskiness of  V  (i.e. 
the market subspace in the absence of  a). Both play an important role in the next proposition. 
1 -  E(q)  measures the maximum gain that can be attributed to any bond a since 
It  11;  -  tl  7  11;  5  1-  I1  7 [I;=  1 -  av2)  = 1 -  E(7) 
The maximum gain is attained wh~en  B E  Val  which happens either if a = 1,  or if a is risky and 
IL  can be obtained by a combination of  a and some vector in V:  by (11) this occurs when a is 
perfectly correlated with some vector y # a in V. $3.  Welfare and the Statistical Charircteristics of  the Bond 
For normalized bonds of  a given variability a. the minimum gain as a function of  p depends 
on whether the bond is less or more variable than the (normalized) least risky income stream 
rj in V:  when a < a+  the bond is  less risky than any security in V and thus necessarily leads to 
a positive gain; when a 2 a;, then the bond will not contribute towards risk reduction if  it does 
not permit the risks in V to be Ihedged. 
All  bonds a E R'  with the same vector of  correlation coefficients pa = p with  vl,  .  .  . ,  v
J, 
have the same correlation coeffi~cient  p(a, 7)  with the least risky security  77  in  V, regardless of 
their variability:  for rl can be written as n = xfXI  A,+,  so that 
which is a linear function of  (pa,,].  ,  .  . .  ,  p,,~) which is  independent of  a,.  As a result a coefficient 
of  correlation r E  [-I, 11  defines a subset of  R 
which is the intersection of  R by  a hyperplane in  RJ. The domain R is  thus partitioned into 
two regions depending on the si,p  of  the correlation coefficient between a and the least risky 
security q 
RC  =  E 12  1  p(a,  q)  :>  0 for all a E  RS  with pa = p) 
72- =  e 7Zl p(a.7) < 0 for all a a R'  with pa 
Proposition 4 (Properties of' the Statistical Gains Function): 
(A) Properties of g as a function of  p (for fixed a > 0): 
(0)  For any a > 0, g(a, .) is is convex function on  the interior of R. 
(i) (Low variability):  if 0 < (7 < a+, then the maximum of g(a,  -) is attained for aU  p E aR 
and 
for all p E  a~  g(a,p) = 1-E(q) == 1- - 
1 + a; 
The minimum is attained for the unique vector p* = (a/ael,.  .  .  ,  ~/u~J)  and 
1 
g(u,  p*) := -  - 
1 
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(ii:) (High variability): if u > a,j,  the minimum of g(u,  .) is attained for the vectors p whch 
lie in  the J -  1 dimensional subset RTU  with r, = a6/a  md  g(a, p) = 0 for all p E  1;:-  .  The 
maximum of g(a,  -)  is attained fix all vectors p E  872\%&,,  and 
If dim V  _>  2, then g(a, .) is  discontinuous at the points a72 fl R,. 
(iii) (Intermediate case): if a = a+ the  subset 7?&-  = R,  on which g(a, -)  attains its  minimum 
reduces to the point p* = (a/acl,. .  .  ,  U/U+J)  E  a7E and g(a, p*) = 0.  The rusxiruurn of g(a,  .) 
is attained for all vectors in 6R\1t1  and is given by (1  2). If dim V 2 2, then g is discontinuous 
at  p*. 
(B)  Properties of g as a function of a (for fived p E R\8R). 
If p  E Re,  then g(., p) is strictly decreasing for all a > 0;  if p E Rt,  then there exists a 
critical variability a* = u4  /p(a, q) such  that g(-,  p) is strictly decreasing for a E (0,  (7')  and 
strictly increasing for a E  (a*,  00). Thus g(.,  p) is strictly decreasing for all a > 0 if and only if 
p E  R-'  . 
Proof:  (See section 5) 
Single Security Case (J  = 1). P,  geometric proof of  Propositions 3 and 4 can be given in the 
simplest case J = 1, S = 3 (recall that Assumption I (iii) requires S 2 J +  2). Let v denote the 
payoff on the single security, (v) =:  V.  Since the welfare gain only depends on the normalized 
income streams, it suf5ces to restrict attention to income streams lying in the plane 
P=  {I  E  R3)  Z(r)  = 1) = {ZE R31  [[z-  1,  111 =0) 
which passes through the riskless imcome stream P  and is y-orthogonal to 1. To simp1.ify the 
geometry we consider the case of  equal probabilities so that the y-inner product coincides (up 
to the coefficient 1/3) with the Euclidean inner  Since for a normalized income stream 
11  2- 1  \I;=  a2(S),  a circle in  the plane P centered at 1  of  radius a  represents all the normalized 
random, variables  Ei which have the same standard deviation a. Since dim V = 1, q = projvl 
is collinear to v so that Sj = v^  and a3 = a+. The three cases appearing in Proposition 4A, 
'The same  Figures 1-3 are valid in the general case of  unequal probabilities by appropriately changing units 
along  the co-ordinate axes  i.e.  by  chang6ng from  the standard basis  {el,  e2,  e~)  to the basis  (e',,  eh, cj) with 
e', = ke,, s  = 1,2,3. 83.  'Welfare and the Statistical Characteristics of  the Bond 
a < (>:  =)  a;  correspond to the cases where  ij  lies outside (inside, on) the circle of' radius o 
(see Figures 1-3). For any ch0ic.e of  2, the market subspace V, = (a;u)  intersects the plane P 
along the line (S,  8) passing through H and 8 i.e.  P  17 (a,  v)  = (S,  G).  The closer the line (4,  C) 
is to 1,  the geater the gain in welfare. 
Given 8, the distance of  the line (5,  G) from 1 depends only on the radius a of  the circle on 
which ii lies and on the angle O(S -  1,  ii -  P) between the vectors f  -  1  and 5  -  1 -- or more 
precisely (by symmetry) on the cosine of  this angle. This cosine is the correlation coefficient pa 
between a and v,  since 
Thus the gain function  G(a) depends only on (aa,  pa) i.e.  g(a) = g(u,  p) for all a such that 
(aa,~~~)  = (a,  p).  In order for a pair (a,  p) E R x  R to correspond  to the standard deviation 
and correlation coefficient of  a random variable S, a must be non-negative and if a > 0, p must 
belong to the domain R  = [-I,  I.]. 
Figures 1-3 show  how  the welfare gains from a  normalized  bond  2 of  a  given standard 
deviation a vary as a function of  the correlation coefficient p between ^a and the vector  G, for 
the three cases a < (>,  =)  a+. In each case  the maximum gain arises when  the line  (5,G) 
passes through 1,  so that ]I  E Val. This occurs if  and only if 2 -  B and v^ -  ll are colhnear and 
distinct; since, by  (13))  p IS the cosine of  the angle between H -  B and 3 -  1,  when a st  at this 
corresponds to the case p = f  1. When a = at only  p = -1 gives the maximum gain, since 
when p = 1, S =  8 and there is no welfare gain. 
To study the behavior of  the function g(a,  .) consider first the case of  low-variability bonds 
(a < ae)  shown in Figure 1. If  we  move clockwise around the circle of  radius a from p = -1, 
where 1  E (5, G), the normalized market line  (2,G) moves further away from 1,  reaching its 
maximum distance when p = p*, corresponding to the minimum of  the gains function  (shown 
on the right side of  the figure) imd  then moves  back  toward ]I  until it reaches p = 1, where 
once again  1  E (2,  C) and the gains function returns to its maximum value.  The nalrmalized 
market line  (^a,  8)  is at its maximum distance from 1  when ^a -  5 1L 4 -  1  which is  equivalent 
to E(,(5  -  +)(^a  -  1))  = cov (5 -  8,  2) =  0 u  p*  = a/u6.  At  p*, the line (4,  v^)  is clloser to 1 
than 8,  so that the minimum gxm g(o,  p*) is strictly positive. 
A similar analysis can be made for  the case of  high variability bonds (a > at)  shown in 
Figure 2. Moving from p = -1 to p =  1 the distance of  the line (2,  8)  from 1  at first increases, 
reaching its maximum at p = p*, where 8 -  H 1L G - 1 u  p* = ac/o  and then decreases to $3. Welfare and the Statistical Characteristics of  the Bond 
Figure 1:  Low variability case: (left) in the  plane P,  the market line (&, 6) for diffemrt values 
of  p  and a fied a < a+;  (right) the graph of  g(a,  .)  . 
Figure 2: High variability case (a  > Q). 
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Figure 3:  Intermediate case (a = a+). 
zero at p = -1.  At p* the distance of  the line (5,G) from  P is  the same as the distance of  v^ 
from  B so that there is no welfare gain from 2 and g(a,  p*) = 0. 
In the intermediate case (a  = T+)  shown in Figure 3, moving clockwise around the circle from 
p = -1 (where B E  (ii, G)) the line (2,G) moves progressively further away from I,  reaching its 
maximum distance for p* = 1:  at this value of  the correlation coefficient, the line (5,  G) collapses 
to the: point G (i.e. there is a drop in  the dimension of  the market subspace) and g(a,  :L)  = 0. 
In all three cases the minimum gain always occurs when there is  no "synergy" between the 
bond  ^a and the security 8 for reducing market risks: the projection of  1  onto the market line 
(5,  5) is  ^a  when a < a6  and is  5 when a 2 at.  For  all other values of  p  (i.e.  p  jf  p*), a 
combination of  2 and  G creates the least risky security on the line (2, G)  and this semcurity is 
less risky than either 2 or 5 taken on their own.  Placing the family of  curves on the right side 
of  Figures 1-3 on a common graph (Figure 4) shows how  the welfare gains change when the 
variability of  the bond is increase!dI2  for a given p.  For negative correlation -1 < p 5 0, g(-,  p) 
2The  family of curves  in Figure 4  is best understood by noting that there are three 'limit curves"  corresponding 
to the casea u  = 0,  a  = a*  and a = oo.  When a .--. 0 the graph of the gains function moves  towards the horizontal 
line obtained for a  = 0;  as u  is increased the curves are pulled down towards the curve obtained for u  = o*,  the 
minimum  in each case being on the dotted line. For a  > u*,  as o  is increased the curves slide towards the curve 
obtained for o  = m, the minimum  in each case being zero. $3.  LVelfare  and the Statistical Charac1:eristics of  th.e Bond 
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Figure 4:  Welfare gai~ls  for a family of bonds of increasing  variability. 
is a decreasing function for all values of  a;  for positive correlation 0 < p < 1, g(.,  p) is decreasing 
for a < a,j/p and increasing for a :> q/p:  no'te that- for a > u6/p,  while g(.,  p) is increasing it 
is  bounded above by g(oo,  p). Note also that increasing the variability of  a low variability bond 
(a  I  a,j)  always decreases the welfare gain, provided p # f  1. 
General Case (J 2 2).  Direct geometric arguments of  the kind given above are no longer 
available in  the multidimensional case J 2 2, since by  Assumption I, S > J + 2.  What is 
remarkable is that by  explicitly ca~lculating  the function g(o,  p) and deriving analytically its 
properties, it is  possible to show how these results extend to the multi-dimensional case J 2  2. 
The explicit derivation of  the function g(a,  p) and the study of  its properties is given in section 
5. 
In geometric terms, Proposition 3(iii) asserts that the welfare gain from a normalized bond 
^a depends only on its distance a fmm  Il  and on the angles (more accurately the cosines of  the 
angles) pl,  .  . . ,  p~ with the J securities vl,.  . . ,  v
J. Part A of  Proposition 4 shows that the gains 
function g(a,  .) behaves somewhat differently according as this distance a is smaller or greater 
than the distance of  of  the (normalized) least risky security ij in  V from 1. The restriction 
on p = (pl,.  . .  ,  pJ) given by  the domain R,  which generalizes the constraint p E [-I, 11,  when 
J =  1,  describes the restrictions on p in order that the pair (a,  p) correspond to a bond 2  E R~. 
For  any a > 0,  when p E CV?.,  a bond with angles p = (pl,.  .  .  ,  pJ) is perfectly con-elated 
with a vector y E V i.e.  2-  1  is collinear to G--  P  (see (11))  and if  a $ V then B E  V,. If  a. < a+, 
then a cannot belong to V and all p E aR give the maximum of  g(a,  .). If a Zai,  then a may 53.  'Welfare and the Statistical Chamcteristics of  the  Bond 
lie in V:  thus when p varies in aR,  the subspace V,  can either contain I.  in 11-hich  case the gain 
is mtaximal,  or for some values "collapse" to V, in  which case the gain is zero. These changes in 
the dimension of  V,  create the discontinuities reierred to in (ii) and [iii) of  Proposition 4(A). 
When 0 < a < a+ the distsrnce from  1  to V, is  less than or equal to the distance from 1 
to  (a)  and the minimum is attained when the projection qva of  1 onto Va is collinear to a. It 
turns out that tb  occurs for a unique vector p*  >> 0 of  correlation coefficients.  Whea a 2  ai, 
the distance from 1 to Va  is  less  than or equal to the distance from  R to V and the illinimum 
is attained when the projection qva of  1  onto Va  coincides with the projection q of  11  onto V: 
in this case the bond does not contribute anything toward risk reduction and the minimum is 
zero.  If  a > a*, this occurs for all  the vectors p in the intersection 72,  of  a h?rperpl.ane with 
R,  the hyperplane being tangent: to 82  when a = a+ 
Figure 5:  Welfare,gains as function of  p  for the two security case (J  =  2). (a)  Low variability: 
a family  of  gains  surfaces  for increasing  values  of  the  parameter a. with a < a$.  (b) High 
~aria~bility:  a gains surface with a > ai. 
Figures 5 (a) and (b) show the graphs of  the gains function g(a,  .) when J = 2, for the case 
of  bonds of low variability (a  < ai) and high variability (a > at) respectively. The graphs are 
obtained from the explicit expressions for g derived in section 5 assuming that plz =  C)  (so that 
i372  is  the unit circle) and a,~  = a,2.  When (pl,pz)  are restricted to lie along the line pl = p2, $4. Nominal versus Indexed Bond 
the family of  gains surfaces reduce to curves similar to those in Figures 1 and 2. 
Part  B of  Proposition  4  which  analyses the gains function g(.,  p) shows  that the result 
demonstrated in Figure 4 when J = 1, holds for the general case J 2  2 provided ac/p  is replaced 
by a*  = ajj/p(a, 77).  In particular if  p(a,  77) > 0 then even though g(.,  p) decreases for a < a*, 
it is  strictly increasing for a > a':  thus p(a, q)  10  is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
g(.,  p) to be strictly decreasing for all a > 0.  This plays an important role in the general version 
of  Proposition 5 studied in the next section. 
4.  Nominal  versus Indexed Bond 
The model outlined in section 2 when combined with the results of  the previous section 
provides a fkamework for analyzing the circumstances under which a nominal and/or an indexed 
bond are more likely to be traded, in  an economy.  We  begin by  considering two extreme cases 
where tle answer is  clear cut, since one of  the bonds is  the "ideal"  bond with const.ant real 
purchasing power payoff. 
(a)  Conditions under which aN 
:= Jl  or aR = 1 
The payoff of  the nominal bond in  the purchasing power economy is 
The variations in the purchasing power of  money vs depend on how the money supply iWs varies 
with aggregate output, as measured by  the index h(ws). In order for  us  to be constant across 
the states, the money supply Ms must be proportional to h(ws) or, in terms of  growth rates, 
the rate of  growth M, of  the money supply must match the rate of  growth g,  of  real output so 
that (for some constants) 
This condition  would  be satisfied in  the idealized setting where a monetary authority (or a 
banking system) perfectly controls (adapts) the money supply to the fluctuations in real output 
(h(wS)).  In this case, since the naminal bond is the ideal bond aN = v = I,  there is no role for 
an ind.exed bond. 
If  ,the bond is indexed on the value of  a bundle of  goods b E  then it becomes a real bond 
whose purchasing power across the states $4.  Yominal versus Indexed Bond 
is  not  influenced by  fluctuations in  the purchasing power of  monev.  However  if  the relative 
prices of  the goods (proportiona.1  to Vh,(w,))  varv across the states, then the purchasing power 
aR  fluctuates.  In  this model, in  view of  Assumption H, it would  be  possible to avoid these 
fluctuations by  indexing on a stsate  dependent  bundle b, = w,/h(w,)  which is proportional to 
aggregate output in state s.  Indlexing on this ideal state dependent bundle permits the creation 
of  the riskless real income stream 
If  indexation could create such a riskless real income stream, then agents would onky use the 
indexed bond and the nominal bond would  disappear. 
In a more realistic model in  ~uhich  agents do not have identical preferences for goods within 
each state, no such ideal reference bundle -  and hence no such ideal index -  exists.  We 
invoked Assumption H to simplify the analysis of  equilibrium -  by factoring out the influence 
of  the income earned by agents on the financial markets on the determination of spot prices - 
certainly not to suggest that there is an ideal index. To capture the inherent imperfections of 
indexation in spite of  the simplifying Assumption H, we assume that the reference bundle must 
be state independent.  This assumption also captures the fact that in practice an index is more 
credible if  its computation does not involve the use of  a state dependent reference bundle, since 
the possibility of changing the bundle as the contingencies vary opens the door to manipulations 
to either understate or overstate inflation, depending on the interests of  the parties involved. 
Although neither of  the extreme cases where the purchasing power of  money is constant 
or there exists an ideal index is  likely  to be  met in  practice, it is instructive to identify the 
circumstances in which one of  the two types of  bond -  nominal or indexed -  has a relative 
advantage over the other. This may be done by analyzing which bond creates the greater social 
welfare, under the assumption that only one of  the two bonds is  traded. 
(b)  Conditiom under which ah' or aR is  socially preferred. 
We  want  to apply  the analysis of  section  3 to a purchasing power economy  £(u,  e, a,  V) 
where a denotes either the nominal or the .indexed bond and V is the matrix of  payoffs on the 
underlying risk sharing securities, all payoffs being expressed in purchasing power.  Consider 
first the simplest case where V consists of  a single security (J  = 1). Given Assumption  S its 
payoff  v must be $4. Nominal versus Indexed Bond 
The projection  rl  of  1  onto V must then be collinear to u so that ij = h,(wl)/E(h(wl)).  Thus 
u,j  depends on the variability of a
ggr
egate output (measured with the aggregator h). 
The risk characteristics of  the real bond depend on the underlying real side of  the economy. 
Since aR  = Vh(ul)b,  the variability U~R  of the normalized indexed  bond  depends on  the 
magnitude of  the fluctuations in relative prices, which in turn depends on the extent to which 
supply-side shocks idhence the relative quantities of  the goods across the states.  If  the real 
shocks which affect  the economy are primarily economy-wide, affecting all  sectors (goods) in 
a similar  fashion,  then the fluctuations in output captured  by  v,j  will  be greater  t,han the 
fluctuations in relative prices summarized  in U,g  (see Figure 6(a)). Conversely the csse a&R > 06 
arises when the real shocks are primarily sectoral, affecting sectors differentially while creating 
only small fluctuations in the level of  output (see Figure 6(b)). Clearly the greater the relative 
price fluctuations the smaller the potential gains from an indexed bond.  The correlation P,R 
Figure 6:  In (a), economy-wide shtxks are greater than sectoml shocks (a6  > a,+);  in  (lb),  the 
reverse (ac  < 0;~). 
depends  on  how  the prices of  the goods which are most  heavily  weighted in  b covary with 
aggregate output:  if  the supply wc, of  the goods l,  whose components bL in the index have a 
substantial weight, are positively (negatively) correlated with aggregate output (h(w,)), then 
Qa~  will be negative (positive). In view of  Figure 4, when the correlation is relatively small, the 
potential gain is greater when the correlation is  negative than when it is positive. 
The risk characteristics of  the nominal bond depend on the interaction between the real and $4. ?lomind versus Indexed Bond 
the monetary sides of  the econoirny. In the analvsis that follows it is useful to distinguish two 
categories of economies depending on the role attributed to monetary policy: 
(i)  :Economies in which a primay objective of  ~nonetary  policy is  to stabilize the purchasing 
power of  money.  &/lost developed countries are in this category with average annual inflation 
lying between 1 and 15% per annum and standard deviation of  the same order of  magnitude. 
Even in these economies, there is  always some variability in  the purchasing  power of  money 
due to imperfections in the control of  the money supply process by  the Central Bank or to the 
fact that monetary policy must ah  meet other objectives such as full-employment. This is the 
category of  economies in which the absence of indexed bonds has been somewhat of  a puzzle 
to economists. 
(ii)  Economies in which the money supply is used to finance government expenditure. These 
are typicdy economies in which idation is high and very variable, the variability in inflation 
being due to periodic attempts to drastically lower  the rate of  inflation.  Many less developed 
countries are in this category, haxing mean and standard deviation of  inflation  per ailnum in 
exces. of 200%. In these economj.es nominal bonds are typically replaced by indexed bonds. 
The economies in  (i) and  (ii) differ  by  the magnitude of  U~N.  For  both categories  of 
economies, however, the statistical relation underlying the Phillips curve, namely that inflation 
and output are positively correli~ted,  suggests that typically the purchasing power o!f  money 
and output are negatively correlated (p,~  < 0). The fact that nominal bonds are typicady used 
in economies of  type (i), while indexed bonds are typically used in those of  type (ii), c:an then 
be explained by the following proposition which is a corollary of  Proposition 4. 
Proposition 5 (Nominal versus Indexed Bond):  Given (U~R,  p,~)  which depend on  the 
real side of the economy, with  pa^ # f  1, and gven  pa^ satisfying -1 < p,~  5 0, there exists 
a*  such that if U&N < u*, then the nominal bond leads to greater social welfare and if U;,N  > a*, 
then the indexed bond leads to greater social welfare. 
Proof: Since -1 < p,~  2  0,  by ]Proposition 4B, the function g(.,  p,~)  is strictly decreasing in 
a. Thus if a*  is defined by 
,(I(~*,P~N)  = g(a&~y~a~)  =g 
then ~(u&N,P,N)  >  if  O~N  < a*,  and ~(u&N,P,N)  <  if  U&N > a*.  0 
Thus in  an economy which  is subjected to real shocks there is always an interval [0, a*) 
of  fluctuations in  the purchasin,g power  of  money on  which  the nominal  bond  is  preferred. $4,.  Nominal versus Indexed Bond 
This interval is larger, the ,water  the relative price fluctuations CT~R  and the more nega~tive  the 
correlation P,,N~ between the purchasing power of  money and aggregate output. The exisitence of 
sectoral shocks leading to relative price fluctuations and a relatively strong positive correlation 
between inflation and output may thus be two important elements which help to explain the 
lack of  indexing in Western economies. The proposition also supports the observation that in 
economies with high and variable inflation, agents typically resort to indexed bonds.  For even 
in economies with substantial reltrtive price fluctuations there is always a level of  varii~tion  in 
the purchasing power of  money beyond which agents switch from a nominal to an indexed bond. 
Pn>position  5 extends in a relartively straightforward way to the case where there are many 
securities (J  > 1) that generate the market subspace V.  If  neither  P,,R  nor   pa^  are in dR, 
that is, if  neither  the indexed nor the nominal bond is  perfectly correlated with a marketed 
(real) income stream y  E V  (p(a", y) # f  1 and p(aN,  y) # f  1, V y E V)  and if  p(aN,  q)  L 0, 
where the least risky income stream q in  V no longer coincides with aggregate output h(wl), 
then by  Proposition 4B,  g(.,  p,~)  is strictly decreasing in a so that there exists a a* with the 
properties stated in Proposition 5, namely if Up  < a* then the nominal bond is preferred, while 
if  U&N :> a* then the indexed bond gives greater social welfare. If  the least risky income stream 
q in V is  positively correlated with aggregate output h(wl), then the condition p(aN,  71) S 0 is 
likely to be satisfied.  A qualitative analysis similar to that given for  the single security case 
can then be made in the more realistic case J > 1 -  many securities inevitably being required 
if  the spanning Assumption S  is to be a reasonable approximation. 
(c)  When the restriction to trading only one of  the two  bonds  is  a reasonable acrsumptiion. 
The analysis in (b) was based on the assumption that only one of  the two bonds is  traded. 
We  need  to clarify the conditions under  which  this restriction is  reasonable.  For  there can 
be circ~~mstances  when the correlations p(aN,  d),  ~(a~,  +)  and p(aR,  aN) are such that agents 
would  1Se  much better. off  trading both the nominal and the indexed bond, so that restricting 
them to trading only one of  the two securities gives an artificial result. The analysis in (t))  leads 
to a result with explanatory power only if, when agents trade the preferred bond, augmenting 
their  opportunity set  by  permitting trade in  the other  bond would  not  add  much  to their 
welfare. In such circumstances, even a small transaction cost would cancel the benefit of  using 
the second-best bond. 
To cover the two cases where the nominal (resp.  indexed) bond is preferred, let a denote 
the preferred bond and let a'  denote the second best bond.  The market  subspace when the 55. Proof of  Properties of the Statistical Gains Function 
prefened bond  (from the analysis in  (b) above) is  used  is W = (V. a) and bv  Proposition 4, 
the maximum welfare gain from adding the second bond a'  is 1 -  E(qw),  where q,  is the least 
risky security in W. There are hm  reasons why introducing the bond a'  may add only ;a smaller 
welfare gain.  First, the maximum potential gain 1 -  E(qw) from introducing any additional 
security may be small. Second, the characteristics of  the bond a'  may be such that only a small 
part of this maximum gain can be captured: since a is  preferred to a',  the least risky security 
qW nlust  be closer to P than a'  i.e.  u(a1) > u(7jw),  SO  that a'  falls into the high vrrriability 
category of  Proposition 4, in which the gain may be zero. 
In the case of economies of  type (i), in which the nominal bond is preferred, a com.bination 
of  these two reasons serves to explain why the indexed bond is not more widely used.  First, 
if  the nominal  bond is  negativeky correlated  with most of  the securities V (the stocks), then 
diversification between the nominal bond and the stocks may permit risks to be significantly 
reduced, in which case u(7j,)  is small. If  u(iR)  is relatively large and the correlation p(aR,  7jw) 
is  pos'itive then the gains from introducing aR may be close to the minimum which is zero. 
In the case of economies of  type (ii), in which the indexed bond is preferred, it is the second 
reason  which is likely  to explain why  the nominal  bond  is  not  used.  Even if  the potential 
gain  :is  large,  the nominal  bond  is  not  well-adapted to capture these gains, since  the high 
variatiability of  iN  is  not  compensated  by  a  high correlation  with  real variables.  In these 
economies the correlation  between money and real output (the Phillips curve) is  likely to be 
si@.cantly  reduced.  First, variations in  the ppm are due to alternations  between periods 
of  high government expenditure supported  by  increases in the money supply and  periods of 
stabilization, whose  timing  has :more to do with political events  than with the objective of 
smoothing real output. Second, i.ndexation  serves to isolate the private sector from the impact 
of  monetary shocks.  By  Proposition 4, in the high variability case, the minimum gain of  zero 
N  occurs when p(a , rl,  ) = oily  \UN  : thus if  the variability OIN is very high and p(aN,  17,)  2 0, 
then the welfare gain from introdlucing the nominal bond is likely to be close to zero. 
5. Proof of Properties of  tlhe  Statistical Gains Function 
In this section we prove Propositions 3 an 4.  The order of  the proof will not exactly follow 
the statements of these propositions. It is convenient to begin by calculating the statistical gains 
function, namely the function g(cr6, pa) which expresses the welfare gain G(a) from a blond a as 
a function of its normalized standmd deviation and its vector of  correlation coefficients with the $5.  Proof of Properties of the Statistical Gains Function 
underlying securities v',  . . . ,  uJ ((iii) of  Proposition  3). We  then exhibit  the domain on which 
the function g(a,  p) expresses the ,welfare gain of  some random income stream a E R'  ((i)  and 
(ii) of  Proposition 3). Finally we  tstablish the properties of  g as a function of  p and a (A and 
B of  Proposition 4). 
Some matrix notation simpliiies the calculation of  g. Since the purchasing power payoffs on 
the securities can be normalized to have unit expectation, we  let 
denote the matrix of  normalized payoffs.  The J  x J diagonal matrix of  standard deviations of 
these J  normalized payoffs is denoted by 
and  PV  = [~vivl]i,~=~,...,~ 
intermediate cakulations, 
denotes their J x J matrix of  correlation  coefficients.  For  some 
it is  convenient  to introduce  the following measure of  stochastic 
dependence, defined for non-centered random variables: if  x, y E R',  E(x) # 0, E(y) # 01  define 
Since k(x,  y) = 1 + p(x, y)a(S)a(%),  k(x,  y) is greater (less) than 1 for  positively (negartively) 
correlated random variables. This measure of  stochastic dependence appears naturally in the 
projection formulae. Thus we define 
Computation of the function g.  Recall that the gain function G : R' -  R is defined 
by  G(a) =((  qv,  11;  -  11  q  (1;.  Not surprisingly, the reduction in the distance from  B (or the 
increase of  the length of  the projection) achieved by  changing the market subspace from V to 
V, = (V, a) depends only on the innovation c:omponent of  a relative to the subspace V.  Let 55. Proof of  Properties of  the Statistical Gains Function 
denote the decomposition of a into its component a*  on V and its innovation com.pon,en.t  a'  E V _IL 
and let qal  = proj(,t)l denote the projection of  4 onto the one-dimensional subspace generated 
by a'. 
Lemma  1:  The welfare gain G(a)  from introducing a bond a E R'  is given by G(a)  =(I qa,  11;. 
ProoE  The decomposition of 1  onto Va and  its orthogonal complement vaL  gives 
1  =  nya + 1',  nya E  Va,  1'  € v? 
Since V, =  V $ (a'),  %a  can in -turn  be decomposed into 
qva =u+v,  UEV, VE  (a') 
Lemma  2: The welfare gains  15nction G  : R'  -  R  can  be  expressed  as a function g : 
R+  x R~ -  R  of the normahzed -8bles  (E(s2),  ka) for all a E R'  such that E(a)  # 0 
G(a)  =  ij  (~($1,  ka) = 
,  ifa $ (V) 
\ 0,  if a  E (V) 
Proof:  By formula (4) of  section 3 for the projection matrix Bw with W = (a'), 
so that 
E  (a') 
== I1  q-/ 11;  = - 
E(a9 
Since a' = a -  Bva, 
where the second equality is obtained by dividing the numerator and denominator by ~(a)~ 
and exploiting the orthogonality of  a  and a':  aT[?](a  -  Bva) = 0. Since the y-projection onto $5. Proof of Properties of the Statistical Gains Function 
(V) is  not affected bv  the length of  the vectors which span the subspace (V), the y-projection 
matrix can be written as 
Using the relations lT[?]V = IT and PT[+i  =  k,  leads to formula (1).  0 
Since the variables (E(s~),  k,)  can be expressed as functions of  (aa,  pa), 
substituting the expressions in (2) into equation (I),  leads to a function g(a6,  pa) satisfying 
which proves (iii) of  Proposition  3.  The exact formula for g is  cumbersome and it is  always 
more convenient to make calculati.ons  using the function 5. 
Consider therefore the functions lj : R x RJ -  R  defined by 
and g : R  x R~ -  R defined by 
When the variables (a,  p) correspond to the standard deviation and vector of  correlation coeffi- 
cients of  a normalized random variable ii  E  FtS, then g(o,  p) is  the welfare gain attributable to 
the bond a. Thus  the properties of  g need to be studied only for these relevant values of  (a,  p) 
which we  now characterize. 
Relevant domain  of g. We  begin by  proving the sufficiency part of  Proposition 3(i). 
Lemma 3:  If a E R',  then either (a,,  pa) == (0,O) or a,  > 0 and  pa is such that [pv -  pap:] 
is positive semi-definite. Furthermore if E(a)  # 0 and  cr,  >  0 then the following properties are 
equivalent : 
(9 det [PV -P,P~] = 0 
(ii)  there exists y  E  V such that p(a, y)  = f  1 $5.  Proof of Properties of the Statisti,cal Gains Function 
(iii) there exist y  E V and  X  E R  s~~h  that S -  lt = X(y -  E(y)l) 
Note that if a 6 V  then (iii) implies that 1 E V, 
Proof: If a E RS, then -1 5 p(a,  y) 5 1 for all y  E R'  and in  particular for all y E V.  If 
a(a)  = 0 and E(a) # 0 then a =: A1  and pa = 0.  If  a(a) > 0, then -1 5 p(a, y) 5 1,  V y E V 
is equivalent to 
Letting  Xj = ijg,,j,  (5) is  equivalent to  XTpap;X  5  XTpvX  for  all  X  E RJ or  [pv -  pap:] 
positive semi-definite.  There exists y E V such that p(a,  y) = f  1 if  and only if  there exists 
i E R~ such that (5) holds with equality, or if  and only if  there exists  X  E RJ  such  that 
XT[pV  -  pap:]X  = 0 Cj  det [pv -pap:]  = 0.  Thus (i) is  equivalent to (ii). On the other hand 
(ii) is equivalent  to 
[[a  -  E(a)l,  y - ~(~)l]]&=j/  a -  E(a)l  11:11  y -  E(y)l  0  for some y E V 
If  E(a)  # 0, dividing by  (~(a))~  gives 
[[B  -  1,  y -  ~(~)4]~  =I]  i  -  1 /I:][  y -  E(y)l  /I:#  0  for some y E V 
By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality this occurs if  and only if  S -  1  and y -  E(y)B, which are 
non-zero, are linearly dependent, whlch gives (iii). (iii) can be written as (1 -  XE(y))B = a-  Xy 
for some X  E  R. If  a 6 V then 1 -- XE(y) # 0 and 1  E  Va.  0 
The next lemma proves that the restriction a > 0 and  [pv -  ppT] positive semi-definite, 
completely characterizes  the (o,  p) which correspond to the standard deviation and vector of 
correlation coefficients of  non-constant random variables in RS. 
Lemma 4:  Let R  = {p E  RJ 1 [pv -  ,opT]  is positive semi-definite) 
(i) R  is a convex subset of R' 
(ii)  = {p E  RJ I det [pv -  ppT] = 0) 
(iii)  If (a,  p) E (0,O)  U  R++ x R., then there exists a E RS with E(a) # 0 such that  (a,,  pa) = 
(0,  PI. 
Proof: The proof of  (i) and (ii) is straightforward  and is left  to the reader.  Proving (iii) is 
equivalent to showing that if  a :>  0 and p E R  then the following system of  equations has a 
solution: 55.  Proof of Properties of  the Statistical Gains  Function 
Find a E R'  such that 
In  terms of  the standardized variables 
the problem (A)  is equivalent to: 
Find x E R'  such that 
:since rank  5 J +  1 < S,  the problem (A
f) has a solution if and only if  the minimum value 
satisfies h(p) I  1. For if z* gives the minimum of  this problem then, for all  solutions y E EtS of 
#. 
the homogeneous equations C[y]y =: 0,  x = x* + Ay  satisfies @y]x  = [;I  and an appropriate 
1  choice of  X  leads to X~[~]X  = 1.  The solution of  the problem  (P)  is given  by  x* = Cpv  p 
where pv  = c[~]c~  is the symmetric positive definite matrix of  correlation coefficients of  the 
1.ectors vl,  .  . . ,  v
J, and  h(p) = x**[~]x*  = drp;lp.  If  [pv -  ppT] is  positive semi-definite, 
then for  <  = p;'p,  tT[pV -  pPT][  3 0 which  implies  pTp~lp  -  (pTp;1p)2  2  0 and since 
T -1  c1 Pv P > 0,  h(p) I  1. 
Note that for any (a,  p) E R++ x R, the expected value of  the random variables a E R'  such 
that (ua,  pa) = (a,  p) is arbitrary: if  x is a solution to (A'), then for any  X E  R,  a = ax  + XI  is 
a solution to (A).  0 $5.  Proof of  Properties of  the Statistical Gains Function 
Lemmas 1-4 complete the proof of  Proposition  3.  It remains to establish the properties of 
the statistical gains function g on the domain R++ x R. 
Properties of  the function q.  The function g(a,  p) defined by  (4) is obtained  from the 
function g(m,  k) defined by  (3), via the chaiage of  variable 
While the variables (a,  p) have  ir more natural economic interpretation,  the variables (m, k) 
are better adapted to analyzing properties derived from projection formulae: the properties of 
g(a,  p) will thus be derived from the properties of  the function c(m,  k). 
The function ?(m, k) is  rational function which we  write as 
The relevant domain for  ij  is  the image of  R++ x R under  the change of  variable (6).  It is 
convenient to begin by studying when the denominator Q(m,  k) vanishes. 
Lemma 5:  If (a,  p) E  EL++ x 72 and (m,  k) is  defined by  (6),  then 
(i) Q(m7 k) 2 0 
(ii) Q(m,  k) =  0 a  every a cf  R~  such that (a,, pa) = (a,  p) satisfies a E  V 
(iii)  Q(m,  k) = 0 ==s  p E  dR  and a 2 a*. 
Proof:  Let a E R~  be such that (Q, pa) = (a,  p) and let (m,  k) be deduced from (a,  p) by (6), 
then ?(m,  k) = (E(~'))~/E(@)  where a'  is the innovation component of  a relative to V.  Thus 
Q(m,  k) = E(aR)  2 0 and Q(m,  k) = 0  if  antd only if  a' = 0 u  a  E V,  which proves (i) and 
(ii). If  a E V,  then there exists y  E V (y = a) such that p(a,  y) = 1, and by Lemmas 3 and 4, 
p E  dR.  Moreover in this case a = a6  > 04, since a6  c  a6 would contradict the minimum risk 
property of  7j in Proposition 2 (ii) b.  0 
Lemma 6:  For  all a E  R++,  g(,~,  -) is a convex function on int R. 
Proof: Given the linearity of thle change of' variable (6),  it suffices to prove that k -  ?(m, k) 
is a convex function of  k on the domain Q(m,  k) > 0.  The matrix of  second derivatives of  ij 55. Proof of Properties of the Statistical Gains Function 
with respect to k is given bv 
where V (resp. vT)  denotes the gradient (resp. transpose of  the gradient) and where 
VN(~)  = -2(1-  iT~-lk)~-li 
L>~N(~)  = 2~~~11~~" 
Inserting these expressions into (7) leads to 
which is non-negative for all z E ltJ,  since K-'  is positive definite and Q > 0. 
We  now study the minima of  the function g(a,  .). Since g is a convex function of  int R,  the 
values of  p E int R  for which g attains a minimum are the solutions of  the first order condition 
Vd(a,  p) = 0. Since 
vfl(a, P) = u[up]VkG 
and since [a?]  is  invertible, these dues  of  p correspond to the values of  k such that Vkg(m, k) = 
0 (with m = 1  + a2). Define the functions H : RJ -  R and F : RJ -  R~ 
noting that the numerator of  saf;isfies N(k) = (~(k))~.  Then 
Since K-'  is invertible, Vkij(m,  k) = 0 if  and only if 
either (i) H(k) = 0 $5.  Proof of Properties of the Statistical Gains Function 
or (ii) F(m,  k)  = 0 
The next two lemmas locate the zeros of  H and F respectively. For fixed m.  = 1 + a2,  the zeros 
of  H define a hyperplane in RJ. 
Lemma 7:  (a)  Let p E Ha17R, then (i) g(o,,  p) = 0 and (ii) a E RS  is such that (aa,  pa) = (a,  p) 
if and only if 
34~,1-,]=0 -  ma=,  ~h  7)  =: 
(p)  If a < a+  then 31,  does not intersect R. 
(7)  If  a = ail then 31,  is tangent to R  at the unique point  p*  = U~[U~]-'B  E 6%. 
(6) If a > a+  then 31,  intersects R  and the relative interior of  Run  int R is an open subset 
of dimension J -  1. 
2 
ProoE  (a)  (i) If  p  E 31,  n R then g(o,p)  = P(m,  k)  = &#  = 0.  (ii) Note that E(B)  = 
1,  j = 1.. . . ,  J implies ?T[y]P  = 1. Thus q, which is the projection of  ll onto (V), is given by 
so that 
E(:q)  = llT[y]Q~-ll  = lTK-l1 
Thus if a E R',  since ka = (~(5,.  . i),  .  . . .  E(G<  i))  = 3~2 
(11) and the definition of H in (8) imply 
Thus B -  q is orthogonal to 5. Since by definition I -  q is  orthogonal to V, ll -  q E v,'L  which 
implies that q is the projection of  B onto 11,  i.e.  q = 77v,  Furthermore 1 -  E(2q)  = 0 
1 -  E(q) -  p(a,  q)aaq  =  0 and d:ividing by  .E(q)  this is equivalent to 
where the last step is derived frclm the equidity a:  = &  -  1 proved in Proposition 2 (iii). $5.  Proof of  Properties of  the Statistical Gains Function 
(3)  By (a),  p E 31,  n  R  implies ~(a,  7) = a3/u  which is  impossible if u < uq: thus R,  n R  = 0. 
(y) If  a E  is such that (ah,  pa)  = (a,  p) with a = ai, and  p E H,  nR  then by (a),  p(a,  q)  = 1 
and by Lemma 3, ii -  B = X(q -  .G(q)  1) = A'($ -  1) with A'  > 0  since the correlation is positive. 
a6  = gi u  I( a -  B 11-,=11  ?j  -.  1  /I7 which implies ii  = 5j so  that p,  = p,,  and by Lemma 5, 
p,  E 8'2. p1  is readily computed, since k, = PT[?]i)  = -&cT[7]P~-1~  = &KK-'I  =  B  m 
so that solving from I +  a,j  [at]/;+  = 4  gives 
B  (6) Since X,,  is  a hyperplane in R~,  it suf£ices to show that Ron  int R  # 0. Consider k* = m. 
I7 ?  By (lo),  H(k*)  = 0. Let us prove that p* such that k* = 1  +  a[ae]p* namely p* = $[o~]-~I~ 
lies in  the interior of  72. For any X E  R~,  consider the vector y = x$i A,$  with co-ordinates 
X on the normalized basis of  V.  Then 
Since a > a+  and since  7j is  the minimum  risk income stream in  V, a6  2 ail, so  that the 
expression is always strictly positive, implying that p*  E int R.  13 
For fixed m =  1 +  a2, the zeros of  F define the subset of  R~ 
Lemma 8:  (a)  If a < a,=,,  then 3, fl R  = {p*} where  p*  = o[aP]-'1  =  ,...,L)  E 
UCJ 
int R,  and 
1  1 
!?(a,  p*) = :7  - -  I+u  1+0;  (12) 
(p)  Ifa  1  ai, then FUnR  c 3i,naR. 
Proof: By (8), F(m,  k)  = -Q(m,  k)l+ H(k)k  so that F is  a linear combination of  the vectors 
{I,  k).  Either  k is  collinear to 1  or these vectors are  linearly independent.  In the first case 
F  = 0 only if  k = mB  and this corresponds to a value p*  such that $5. Proof of Properties of the Statist;ical Gains Function 
p*  E R if  for all X E EtJ 
*  *T 
~~[apl~pv  -  P  P  ][ao]X  L  0 
which is  equivalent (see proof of  Lemma 7(S))  to a; -  u2 2  0 for all  y E V,  or to a 5 a*. If 
a < a*  then the inequality is strict so that p*  E int R. Since k* = ml,  it follows from (10)  that 
(1 -  rnlT~-'1)  (1  -  rnE(q)) 
g(u,  p*) = G(m,  k*)  =  -  - 
m -  m211~~-111  m(1- mE(7)) 
If a = afi,  then p*  is  given by (1.3) with a = ai, and thus coincides with the point in Xu n aR 
given by Lemma 7(7) and g(a,  p*) = 0. 
If  the vectors {k, 1)  are lineitrly independent., then F = 0 if  and only if  Q = 0 and H = 0: 
by Lemma 5,  the former implies  p E aR and u  2 a*  and the latter implies  p E  7-1,.  Thus if 
u  2  a,j,3,~R~X,naR.  O 
Since by Lemma 6,  g(a,  .) is convex on int R,  it follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 that if  a  5  a3 
then g (a,  .  ) attains its minimum at the unique point p* given by (U),  and g (a,  p* ) is  given by 
(14).  If  u > a*  then g(o,  .)  attains its minimum for  all  points p  on  the intersection of  the 
hyperplane 7-1,  with ?E  and g(a,  p) = 0 for all such points.  By Lemma 7(a),  'R,  il  R coincides 
with the set %,  with r, = ai/cr  consisting of the vectors p  E R such that p(a,  77) = u+/u  for 
all a E  R'  with pa = p. 
The next lemma locates the values of  p for which g(o,  .) attains its maximum on R:  this 
consists of all the boundary  points of  R  which do not lie on  the hyperplane  7-1,.  Since g is 
zero on 'R,,  it follows that g has a discontinuity at the boundary points which lie on 'R,,  when 
J 2 2. 
Lemma 9: (a)  g(a,  .) attains its maximum on  R  for all  p  E  aR\7-1,  and  g(a,p) =  1 - 
E(7),  v p  E m\Ro 
(0) If  a < 03,  then g(a,  .)  is  continuom on R.  If a 2 a*  and  J  2 2,  then g(a;)  has a 
discontinuity at p E  dR  n  31,  and g(a,  p) = 0,  V  p E d7E n7-1,. 
ProoE  (a)  Since g(o,  p) = G(a)  =I[  qva  11;  -  11  qv  I[:,  for  all  a E R'  such that (~a,  pa) = 
(a,  p),  g  attains its maximum  wlhen  qv, = B t"  R E Va. By Lemmas 3 and 4, this occurs 
when  p  E dR  and a $ V. Since a E  V  is  equivalent to E(a
t)  = 0  where a
t  is the innovation $5. Proof of Properties of  the Statistical Gains Function 
component of  a, and since (see proof  of  Lemma 2) E(at)  = H(k,), the maximum of  g(a,  .j 1s 
attained for p E  dR\'H,. 
(p)  Since  g is  a  rational function  it  can be  discontinuous only at the points  where  the 
denominator is zero.  When a < 06,  by  Lemma 5, Q > 0,  so that g(a,  -) is continuous on R. 
When a  > a+  Q = 0 when  p  ~f a72 n  3.1,  and g(a,  .)  has a  potential discontinuity at such 
points.  Since R  is  a manifold ~11th  boundary of dimension J,  its boundary aR is a manifold 
of  dimension J -  1.  When J -  11  = 0,  aR consists of  isolated points and we saw in section 3 
that g(a,  .) is not discontinuous $at  p E  82  n  3.1,.  For  J  2 2, when  p moves in dR,  which is 
now of  dimension J -  1 2 1,  g(a,  -)  has the value 1 -  E(q)  when p 4 X,,  and 0 when  p E 3.1,. 
Thus there is a discontinuity which arises from the drop in dimension of  Va which looses one 
dimension when a goes from being outside V (in which case it contributes a great deal) to being 
inside V (in which case it contributes nothing).  13 
Since &,  = 31,  il  R, this co;mpletes the  roof of part A of Proposition 4.  It remains to 
study    he  properties of  g as a function of  cr.  In section 3 it  was shown that the correlation 
coefficient p(a,  7)  with the least risky security 77  is the same for all  a E R'  with the same vector 
of  correlation coefficients pa.  The expression for p(a,  17)  as a function of  pa is 
Substituting the expression for  k,  in (2) gives 
Thus 
p E R+  (resp.'R-)  B~K-'  [oQ]p  > 0 (resp.  < 0) 
The behavior of  g as a function of  a depends on whether p lies in Rf or R-. 
Lemma 10:  Consider any p E  ink  R. 
(a)  If  p E 72-,  then g(., p) is strictly decreasing for all a > 0. 
(p)  If  p  E R+, then  there  exists a* = a6/p(a,q) such  that g(-,p)  is strictly decreasing for 
a  E (0,  a')  and strictly increasing for o E (a*,  w)  . $5.  Proof of Properties of the Statistical  Gains Function 
Define 
L(a,  p) = apT[ai;]  K-'F(~,  k) -  a2~(k) 
with (m,  k) given by (17).  Then 
-.  = - 
au  uQ2 
Let us show that L(o,  p) < 0, V (a,  p) E  FL++ x int R  so that 
89  (sgn) -  = -  (sgn)  H  aa 
L can be written as 
with (m,  k) given by  (17),  which by appropriately regrouping terms gives 
where L < 0 follows from Q > 0 and g < I -  E(q)  for  a > 0 and  p E int R. Thus if  H > 0 
(resp.  < 0)  then g(.,p)  is strictly decreasing (resp.  increasing).  The expression for  H as a 
function of  (a,  p) is 
which by (15)  can be written as 
Thus  if  p(a, 77)  5 0 then H(a,  p) :>  0 for all a > 0,  which proves (a).  If  p(a,  q)  > 0,  define 
If  a E (0,  a*)  then H(a,  p) > 0 and if  a E  (a*,  m) then H(a,  p) < 0,  which proves (P). 
This completes the proof of  Proposition 4. References 
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